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The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Delgamuukw v. British
ColumbiaI calls for re-examination of a number of significant Aboriginal
rights issues. The crucial role of oral histories in Aboriginal rights litigation
was emphasized by the Court, and guidelines were laid down for trial judges
to admit and give proper weight to that evidence. For the first time the Court
addressed the vital issue of the content of Aboriginal title and provided
direction on how that title can be proved. 2 The Court also dealt with the
constitutional protection accorded to Aboriginal title by s. 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 19823 and explained how infringements of that title can be
justified. Finally, the Court discussed the issue of the division of powers
o Kent McNeil.
Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto. This article is based on a paper entitled "Aboriginal Title
and Federalism: Setting Jurisdictional Limits" which I gave in Victoria, British Columbia, at a
conference on the topic, "'We Are All Here to Stay': The Delgamuukw Judgment", on 26
January 1998. I would like to thank the many people who gave me feedback on that paper, as
well as others who discussed the ideas in this article with me and provided valuable insights,
including Michael Asch, Frank Cassidy, Hamar Foster, Joanne Lysyk, Maria Morellato, Albert
Peeling, Brian Slattery, Marvin Storrow, and Kerry Wilkins. Of course, responsibility for any
errors and omissions is entirely my own.
1 (1997), 153 D.L.R. (4th) 193 [hereinafter Delgamruukw (S.C.C.)]. In this case, the Gitxsan
(spelled "Gitksan" in the judgments) and the Wet'suwet'en Nations made broad claims to
ownership and jurisdiction over their traditional territories in British Columbia. During the
course of the litigation, those claims were modified to Aboriginal title and self-government.
Due to problems with the pleadings and errors made by the trial judge, the Supreme Court
did not determine the outcome of either claim; instead, a new trial was ordered. However, the
Court did lay down some very important principles of law in relation to Aboriginal title.
2 For discussion, see K. McNeil, "Aboriginal Rights in Canada: From Title to Land to Territorial
Sovereignty" (1998) 5 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. 1. For background, see K. McNeil, "Aboriginal
Title and Aboriginal Rights: What's The Connection?" (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 117.
3 Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. Section 35(1) provides: "The existing
aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and
affirmed."
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between the Parliament of Canada and the provincial legislatures in relation
to Aboriginal rights.4 This last issue will be the focus of this article. I will
attempt to show that the Court's pronouncements on this issue result in a
fundamental realignment of constitutional jurisdiction within the provinces
where Aboriginal title can be established.
I. THE DELGAMUUKW DECISION IN THE BRITISH COLUMBIA COURT OF
APPEALS
It is worth looking at the treatment of the division of powers issue by the
British Columbia Court of Appeal because Macfarlane J.A., in his majority
judgment, 6 dealt with the issue in more detail than the Supreme Court of
Canada. Moreover, Lamer C.J.C., delivering the leading judgment in the
Supreme Court,7 explicitly adopted some of Macfarlane J.A.'s reasons and
reached the same conclusions. Both judges discussed the issue of federal and
provincial jurisdiction in the context of extinguishment of Aboriginal title. 8
A further issue, namely whether the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en have a constitutional right of
self-government, though dealt with in the lower courts, was not addressed by the Supreme
Court. In Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 266, Lamer C.J.C. reasoned:
The errors of fact made by the trial judge, and the resultant need for a new trial,
make it impossible for this Court to determine whether the claim to self-
government has been made out. Moreover, this is not the right case for the
Court to lay down the legal principles to guide future litigation.
5 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1993), 104 D.L.R. (4th) 470 [hereinafter Delgamuukw (C.A.)].
6 TaggartJ.A. concurred with Macfarlane J.A. Wallace J.A. wrote a concurring judgment, in which
he said that he was "in complete agreement with the reasons and conclusions expressed by
Mr. Justice Macfarlane in his reasons on this issue" (i.e., the issue of extinguishment, which
includes within it the issue of federal and provincial jurisdiction relating thereto): ibid. at 595.
Lambert J.A., dissenting in part, came to the same conclusions as Macfarlane J.A. on the issue
of post-Confederation jurisdiction to extinguish Aboriginal title: ibid. at 679-81. Hutcheon
J.A., also dissenting in part, did not deal with this issue directly, but did agree with at least
some of Macfarlane J.A.'s treatment of the subject: ibid. at 753.
7 Cory and Major JJ. concurred with Lamer C.J.C. La Forest J., L'Heureux-Dub6 J. concurring,
delivered a judgment arriving at the same result as the Chief Justice, but differing somewhat
on the issues of content and proof of Aboriginal title. On the issue discussed in this article, La
Forest J. said, "I agree with the Chief Justice's conclusion. The respondent province had no
authority to extinguish aboriginal rights either under the Constitution Act, 1867 or by virtue
of s. 88 of the Indian Act [R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5]": Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 284.
McLachlin J. concurred with the Chief Justice, and added that she was "also in substantial
agreement with the comments of Justice La Forest": ibid. Gonthier and lacobucci JJ. did not
sit on the case, and Sopinka J. took no part in the judgment.
8 Note that the Court of Appeal unanimously reversed McEachern C.J.'s holding at trial,
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1991), 79 D.L.R. (4th) 185 (B.C.S.C.) at 462-78, that
Aboriginal title in British Columbia was generally extinguished before the province joined
Canada in 1871: Delgamuukw (C.A.), supra note 5 at 525-31 per Macfarlane J.A.; ibid. at 595 per
Wallace J.A.; ibid. at 673-79 per Lambert J.A. (dissenting on other grounds); and, ibid. at 753-
54 per Hutcheon J.A. (dissenting on other grounds). This resolved the uncertainty on this issue
left by the split Court in Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [19731 S.C.R. 313. While
the matter was not specifically addressed in Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), it is evident from Lamer
CJ.C. and La Forest J.'s judgments that they agreed with the Court of Appeal on this, as
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When British Columbia joined Canada in 1871, subject to the Terms of
Union,9 the provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867,10 including the division
of powers in ss. 91 and 92, became applicable to the new province. Section
91(24) assigns exclusive jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands reserved for
the Indians" to the Parliament of Canada.1 1 So the first issue Macfarlane J.A.
faced in this context was whether that conferral of legislative authority
includes jurisdiction over lands held by Aboriginal title. He decided that it
does, relying on the decision of the Privy Council in St. Catherine's Milling and
Lumber Company v. The Queen, where Lord Watson stated:
[T]he words actually used [in s. 91(24)] are, according to their
natural meaning, sufficient to include all lands reserved, upon any
terms or conditions, for Indian occupation. It appears to be the plain
policy of the Act that, in order to ensure uniformity of administration,
all such lands, and Indian affairs generally, shall be under the
legislative control of one central authority. 12
In this regard, Macfarlane J.A.'s decision went a significant step beyond
St. Catherine's, as in that case Lord Watson had based the Indian title of the
Saulteaux Tribe on the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which specifically reserved
lands for the use of the Indian nations or tribes. 13 After St. Catherine's, if there
they treated Aboriginal title as a property right that exists in British Columbia today where
established by the requisite proof.
9 R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 10. On the constitutional status of the Terms of Union, see British
Columbia (Attorney-General) v. Canada (Attorney-General), [1914] A.C. 153 at 164 (P.C.);
Reference Re Authority of Parliament in Relation to the Upper House, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 54 at 60-63.
Compare Jack v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 294; R. v. Adolph, [1984] 2 C.N.L.R. 96 (B.C.C.A.).
10 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
11 This conferral of legislative jurisdiction necessarily includes executive authority: see Canada
(Attorney-General) v. Quebec (Attorney-General) (1897), 6 B.R. 12 at 22-24 (Que. Q.B.) (sub nom.
Mowat v. Casgrain); Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Co. Ltd. v. The King, [19161 1 A.C. 566 at 579-
80 (P.C.); The Queen v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte: Indian
Association of Alberta, Union of New Brunswick Indians, Union of Nova Scotia Indians, [1981] 4
C.N.L.R. 86 at 93 (Eng. C.A.), Lord Denning M.R.
12 (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46 at 59; as quoted in Delgamuukw (C.A.), supra note 5 at 534 [Macfarlane
J.A.'s emphasis]. Macfarlane J.A. also relied on Strong J.'s dissenting judgment in the Supreme
Court of Canada in that case, (1886), 13 S.C.R. 577 at 615, which he quoted in part as follows:
"'Lands reserved for the Indians' embrace 'all territorial rights of Indians, as well as those in
lands actually appropriated for reserves' [Macfarlane J.A.'s emphasis]. But note that, while the
federal government has jurisdiction over "Lands reserved for the Indians", Lord Watson
decided in St. Catherine's that the underlying title to those lands (special agreement or
constitutional provision apart) is held by the provinces by virtue of s. 109 of the Constitution
Act, 1867.
13 R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. I at 5. See H. Foster, "Roadblocks and Legal History, Part I1:
Aboriginal Title and S. 91(24)" (1996) 54 Advocate 531, especially at 532-33.
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were Aboriginal title lands beyond the territorial scope of the Proclamation
that were not otherwise reserved for the Indians, it could still be argued that
those lands were not covered by s. 91(24).14 When Macfarlane J.A. decided
that the Proclamation does not apply in British Columbia, 15 but held
nonetheless that lands subject to Aboriginal title in the province are "Lands
reserved for the Indians", he implicitly rejected that argument.
In addition to the authority of the St. Catherine's decision, Macfarlane
J.A. relied on a policy argument to conclude that Aboriginal title lands are
under federal jurisdiction by virtue of s. 91(24):
Secondly, it is a sensible result which places the power to block
improvident dispositions, or outright expropriation, of Indian
lands in the hands of the legislature which was made responsible
for Indian welfare generally. Indeed, if the division of powers did
not remove the power to extinguish aboriginal title from provincial
hands, the federal government could find itself unable to protect
this crucial native interest and forced to guarantee Indian welfare
by other means. It would be an absurd result to find the provinces
with the competence to make the federal obligation to Indians
more onerous.
16
As the federal government has responsibility for Indian welfare, 17 it must
have the power to protect Aboriginal rights. Those rights include, but are not
limited to, Aboriginal title to land (an Aboriginal right to fish, for example,
14 For detailed discussion, see R.DJ. Pugh, "Are Northern Lands Reserved for the Indians?"
(1982) 60 Can. Bar Rev. 36.
15 Delgamuukw (C.A.), supra note 5 at 521; see also ibid. at 593-95 per Wallace J.A.; compare ibid.
at 732-36 per Lambert J.A. (dissenting in part) and ibid. at 751-52 per Hutcheon J.A. (dissenting
in part). Note that, in Calder, supra note 8, the Supreme Court split 3:3 on the issue of the
application of the Royal Proclamation in British Columbia. The issue was not dealt with by the
Supreme Court in Delgamuukw (S.C.C.).
16 Delgamuukw (C.A.), supra note 5 at 534-35.
17 See Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 85 at 123, 126, where La Forest J. referred to
"the federal Crown's plenary responsibility respecting 'Indian Lands"' and "its obligations to
native peoples, be it pursuant to its treaty commitments, or its responsibilities flowing from
s. 91(24)." See also ibid. at 105, 108-109, where Dickson C.J.C., concurring, also spoke of "the
constitutional responsibility of Parliament for Indians and Indian lands", and added, "since
1867, the Crown's role has been played, as a matter of federal division of powers, by Her
Majesty in right of Canada, with the Indian Act representing a confirmation of the Crown's
historic responsibility for the welfare and interests of these peoples." See also Roberts v.
Canada, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 322, especially at 337, where Wilson J. for a unanimous Court said,
in the context of the Indian right to occupy and use reserve lands, that the provisions of the
Indian Act, "while not constitutive of the obligations owed to the Indians by the Crown, codify
the pre-existing duties of the Crown toward the Indians."
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can exist independently of Aboriginal land rights). 18 Macfarlane J.A. clearly
recognized the potential breadth of this federal jurisdiction, as he thought
"the federal power found in s. 91(24) has several facets and may well embrace
jurisdiction over all aboriginal rights." 19 He found support for this in Roberts
v. Canada20 where, in his words, "Wilson J., for a unanimous five-judge
bench, held that the common law of aboriginal title underlying the fiduciary
obligations of the Crown to Indian Bands comes within the term 'laws of
Canada' in s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867."21 Indeed, given the decision
in Roberts that the law of Aboriginal title is federal common law because of
s. 91(24), Macfarlane J.A.'s conclusion that "[a]t the very least Parliament has
exclusive jurisdiction over aboriginal rights in land" 22 seems almost
inescapable.
Having reached that conclusion, Macfarlane J.A. went on to consider
whether "valid provincial legislation [can] extinguish aboriginal rights in
land by the incidental effect of a valid grant of an interest in land, including
natural resources." 23 He acknowledged that "valid provincial legislation may
apply to Indians, so long as it is a law of general application and not one that
affects their Indianness, or their status, or their core values." 24 He continued:
The proposition that provincial laws could extinguish Indian title
by incidental effect must be examined in light of an appropriate
understanding of the federal immunity relating to Indians and of
the aboriginal perspective. The traditional homelands of aboriginal
people are integral to their traditional way of life and their self-
concept. If the effect of provincial land legislation was to strip the
aboriginal people of the use and occupation of their traditional
homelands, it would be an impermissible intrusion into federal
jurisdiction. Any provincial law purporting to extinguish aboriginal
18 See R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101; R. v. C6t, [1996 3 S.C.R. 139; and discussion in McNeil,
"What's The Connection?", supra note 2.
19 Delgamuukw (C.A.), supra note 5 at 535.
20 Roberts, supra note 17. For commentary, see J.M. Evans & B. Slattery, "Federal Jurisdiction-
Pendent Parties-Aboriginal Title and Federal Common Law-Charter Challenges-Reform
Proposals: Roberts v. Canada" (1989) 68 Can. Bar Rev. 817.
21 Delgamuukw (C.A.), supra note 5 at 535.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid. Later in his judgment, Macfarlane J.A. expanded on this by recognizing that provincial
laws of general application that do affect "Indianness" or the status or core values of Indians,
while they cannot apply to Indians of their own force, can be referentially incorporated into
federal law by s. 88 of the Indian Act. ibid. at 538-39. Section 88 will be discussed below in text
accompanying notes 30-49, 72-81.
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title would trench on the very core of the subject matter of
s. 91(24).25
He concluded that "the provincial legislatures have not, since Confederation,
had the constitutional competence to extinguish common law aboriginal
rights through the exercise of other jurisdiction-including the making of
land grants."26
Somewhat contradictorily, Macfarlane J.A. also expressed the view that
provincial Crown grants of fee simple and lesser interests in lands and
resources, made before the Constitution Act, 1982 came into force, could not
now be questioned.2 7 He suggested that those grants, while ineffective to
extinguish Aboriginal land rights, might nonetheless infringe them.28
However, he did not reach any definite conclusion on this issue. He observed
that, in a case of infringement,
[w]hat, if any, remedy can be granted...is an extremely complex
and fact sensitive question. A remedy may lie in damages, or in a
reading down of the grant to the extent that it infringes on an
aboriginal [right]. The plaintiffs have taken the practical position
of seeking damages from the province on the basis that liability
flows from a wrongful appropriation of an Indian interest. I think
that was a wise course to take. 29
The plaintiffs' willingness to limit their claims to damages where Crown
grants had been made thus allowed Macfarlane J.A. to avoid any final
determination of the question of the validity of grants. He did, however,
suggest a way for them to be effective, namely by relying on s. 88 of the
Indian Act and the doctrine of referential incorporation. Section 88 provides:
Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other Act of Parliament,
all laws of general application from time to time in force in any
province are applicable to and in respect of Indians in the province,
except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with this Act
or any order, rule, regulation, or by-law made thereunder, and
25 Ibid. at 536.
26 Ibid. at 537.
27 Ibid. at 535.
28 Ibid. at 537.
29 Ibid.
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except to the extent that such laws make provision for any matter
for which provision is made by or under this Act. 30
Case law has held that the effect of s. 88 is to make provincial laws of general
application that would not otherwise apply to Indians because they touch
on either their status or capacity, or their "Indianness", apply to them by
referentially incorporating those provincial laws into federal law.3 1 However,
Macfarlane J.A. was of the view that s. 88 did not authorize the extinguishment
of Aboriginal rights by provincial legislation, as that would require clear and
plain Parliamentary intent, which he found to be lacking. 32 But he did
suggest that s. 88 might authorize the infringement of Aboriginal rights. He
put it this way:
Aboriginal rights fall within the ambit of the core values of
Indians described above, and to which s. 88 has been held to
apply. Thus s. 88, while not authorizing extinguishment of
aboriginal rights, may authorize provincial interference with
aboriginal rights; provincial laws may affect, regulate, diminish,
impair or suspend the exercise of an aboriginal right. Of course,
the operation of such incorporated laws is subject to s. 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982.
In short, provincial land and resource laws affecting aboriginal
rights may be given force as federal laws through the operation of
s. 88 of the Indian Act.33
With all due respect, I think Macfarlane J.A.'s conclusions in this last
quotation suffer from two oversights. First of all, if s. 88 does not authorize
extinguishment of Aboriginal rights because there is no clear and plain
Parliamentary intent to that effect, where is the clear and plain intent that
s. 88 was meant to permit provincial laws to "diminish, impair or suspend
the exercise" of Aboriginal rights? Or does the clear and plain test not apply
to infringements of Aboriginal rights that fall short of extinguishment?
30 Supra note 7.
31 Dick v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 309 at 326-28; C6te, supra note 18 at 191. For critical
commentary, see L. Little Bear, "Section 88 of the Indian Act and the Application of
Provincial Laws to Indians" in J.A. Long & M. Boldt, eds., Governments in Conflict? Provinces
and Indian Nations in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) 175 at 180-87;
B. Ryder, "The Demise and Rise of the Classical Paradigm in Canadian Federalism: Promoting
Autonomy for the Provinces and First Nations" (1991) 36 McGill LJ. 308 at 368-80.
32 Delgamuukw (C.A.), supra note 5 at 539.
33 Ibid.
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In his discussion of the test, Macfarlane J.A. related it specifically to
extinguishment, without limiting its application to that context. He found
the test to be rooted in the well-known presumption against interpreting
legislation as interfering with property and other vested rights unless the
statute is incapable of any other construction. He relied, for example, on
Spooner Oils Ltd. v. Turner Valley Gas Conservation Board, where Duff C.J.C.
said:
A legislative enactment is not to be read as prejudicially affecting
accrued rights, or "an existing status"..., unless the language in
which it is expressed requires such a construction. The rule is
described by Coke as a "law of Parliament"..., meaning, no doubt,
that it is a rule based on the practice of Parliament; the underlying
assumption being that, when Parliament intends prejudicially to affect
such rights or such a status, it declares its intention expressly, unless,
at all events, that intention is plainly manifested by unavoidable
inference.34
Macfarlane J.A. expressed the view that "the clear and plain test should
be applied with as much vigour to aboriginal title as it is to traditional
property rights." 35 He found support for this approach in "the special
relationship between the Crown and aboriginal people which has existed
since the assertion of sovereignty" and the need to uphold "the honour of
the Crown." 36 He concluded:
The clear and plain test, whether applied to vested rights, property
rights, or aboriginal rights, ensures respect for and protection of
those special rights. Although aboriginal rights cannot be easily
described in terms of English property law, they are to be regarded
as unique and important. But, like vested rights and property
rights, they may be impaired or extinguished with or without
compensation by a clear and plain exercise of competent legislative
34 [19331 S.C.R. 629 at 638; as quoted in Delgamuukw (C.A.), supra note 5 at 523 [Macfarlane
J.A.'s emphasis, references omitted]. See also Canada (Attorney-General) v. Hallet & Carey Ltd.,
[19521 A.C. 427 at 450 (P.C.), also relied on by Macfarlane J.A. For discussion of this rule in
the contexts of delegation of legislative authority and creation of executive authority, see
K. McNeil, "Racial Discrimination and Unilateral Extinguishment of Native Title" (1996) 1
A.I.L.R. 181 at 186-87.
35 Delganunkw (C.A.), supra note 5 at 523.
36 Ibid. at 523-24.
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power. However, the legislative intention to do so will be implied
only if the interpretation of the statute permits no other result. 3 7
From this, there appears to be no reason why the clear and plain test should
be applied any less rigorously to infringement than it is to extinguishment of
Aboriginal title.38
Second, by saying that "provincial land and resource laws affecting
aboriginal rights may be given force as federal laws through the operation of
s. 88", 3 9 Macfarlane J.A. inferred that s. 88 referentially incorporates provincial
laws of general application that touch on Aboriginal land rights. In fact, in
the many cases involving s. 88 that have reached the Supreme Court of
Canada, it has never been held that the section has that effect. The Supreme
Court specifically avoided the question in Derrickson v. Derrickson.40
Moreover, in Corporation of Surrey v. Peace Arch41 the British Columbia Court
of Appeal unanimously held that provincial laws relating to use of lands do
not apply on Indian reserves, as the use of reserve lands is within exclusive
federal jurisdiction over "Lands reserved for the Indians". Section 88 was not
even mentioned in the Peace Arch decision, presumably because it was not
considered to be relevant. It was, however, referred to in R. v. Isaac, where
MacKeigan C.J.N.S., after relying on Peace Arch to conclude that reserve land
use comes within exclusive federal jurisdiction, said this:
Section 88 merely declares that valid provincial laws of general
application to residents of a province apply also to Indians in the
province. It does not make applicable to Indian reserve land a
provincial game law which would have the effect of regulating
use of that land by Indians. It does not enlarge the constitutional
37 Ibid. at 524-25 [emphasis added].
38 Note that in leading Supreme Court of Canada decisions on s. 88 of the Indian Act, such as
Kruger v. The Queen, [19781 1 S.C.R. 104 and Dick, supra note 31 at 315, neither Aboriginal title
nor other Aboriginal rights were in issue. Consequently, the Court has not yet dealt with the
question of whether s. 88 clearly and plainly authorizes infringements of Aboriginal rights
falling short of extinguishment.
39 Delgamuukw (C.A.), supra note 5 at 539 [emphasis added].
40 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 285 [hereinafter Derrickson (S.C.C.)]. Notably, in the British Columbia Court of
Appeal's unanimous decision that was affirmed by the Supreme Court, it was held that s. 88
is inapplicable to Indian lands: Derrickson v. Derrickson, [1984] 3 C.N.L.R. 58 at 61 (B.C.C.A.)
[hereinafter Derrickson (C.A.)]. Also, in Cardinal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1974] S.C.R. 695
at 727, Laskin J. (as he then was), dissenting on other grounds, said that s. 88 "deals only with
Indians, not with Reserves."
41 (1970), 74 W.W.R. 380, cited with apparent approval in Cardinal, ibid. at 704-705 per Martland
J. (for the majority) and ibid. at 718-19 per Laskin J. (dissenting on other grounds).
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scope of the provincial law which is limited by the federal
exclusivity of power respecting such land.42
The reason why s. 88 is not generally regarded as including provincial
laws relating to land is that the section refers only to the application of
provincial laws to Indians, not to Indian lands. When this omission is coupled
with the fact that s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 contains not one but
two heads of power-"Indians and Lands reserved for the Indians" 43-the
legislative intent seems to have been to limit referential incorporation to
provincial laws affecting Indians and to exclude provincial laws touching on
Indian lands. This interpretation of s. 88 is supported by the well-established
rule that statutes affecting Aboriginal peoples should be generously and
liberally construed, and any ambiguities resolved in their favour. 44 If it
contains ambiguity, s. 88 should therefore be interpreted so that referential
incorporation extends only to provincial laws of general application that
affect Indians, not Indian lands. 45
There is a further reason why the scope of s. 88 should be limited as
much as possible. As Macfarlane J.A. said, the honour of the Crown is at stake
in its dealings with the Aboriginal peoples. 46 How would that honour be
upheld by Parliamentary delegation of authority to the provinces to infringe
Aboriginal rights through the mechanism of referential incorporation?
42 (1975), 13 N.S.R. (2d) 460 at 474 (N.S.S.C. A.D.). For further authority that s. 88 only makes
provincial laws apply to Indians, not Indian lands, see R. v. Johns (1962), 133 C.C.C. 43 at 47
(Sask. C.A.); Re Park Mobile Homes Sales Ltd. and Le Greely (1978), 85 D.L.R. (3d) 618 at 619
(B.C.C.A.); Millbrook Indian Band v. Northern Counties Residential Tenancies Board (1978), 84
D.L.R. (3d) 174 at 181-83 (N.S.S.C. T.D.) [hereinafter Millbrook Indian Band (S.C.)], affirmed
without reference to s. 88, Re Attorney-General of Nova Scotia and Millbrook Indian Band (1978),
93 D.L.R. (3d) 230 (N.S.S.C. A.D.) [hereinafter Millbrook Indian Band (A.D.)]; Palm Dairies Ltd.
v. The Queen, [1979] 2 C.N.L.R. 43 at 48 (F.C.T.D.); The Queen v. Smith, [1980] 4 C.N.L.R. 29
at 78 (F.C.A.) reversed on other grounds, without reference to s. 88, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 554
[hereinafter Smith (S.CC.)]; R. v. Fiddler, [19941 1 C.N.L.R. 121 at 127-28 (Sask. Q.B.).
43 Four B Manufacturing Ltd. v. United Garment Workers of America, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1031 at 1049-
50 per Beetz J. [emphasis in original].
44 See, e.g., Nowegijick v. The Queen, [1983] 1 S.CR. 29 at 36; Simon v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R.
387 at 402; R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 at 1107-1108; Mitchell, supra note 17 at 142-43
per La Forest J.; and ibid. at 98-100 per Dickson Cj.C.
45 Academic opinion supports this position: see K. Lysyk, "The Unique Constitutional Position
of the Canadian Indian" (1967) 45 Can. Bar Rev. 513, especially at 518, 552; and
"Constitutional Developments relating to Indians and Indian Lands: An Overview", in Special
Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada 1978: The Constitution and the Future of Canada
(Toronto: Richard De Boo Ltd., 1978) 201 at note 49, p. 227; P. Hughes, "Indians and Lands
Reserved for the Indians: Off-Limits to the Provinces?" (1983) 21 Osgoode Hall L.J. 82 at 97;
D. Sanders, "The Constitution, the Provinces, and Aboriginal Peoples" in Long & Boldt, eds.,
supra note 31, 151 at note 14, p. 287; Little Bear, supra note 31 at 187; R.A. Reiter, The Law of
First Nations (Edmonton: Juris Analytica, 1996) at 201.
46 See also Sparrow, supra note 44 at 1107-1109, 1114; R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771 at 794 per
Cory J.; R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at 537 per Lamer C.J.C.
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Would this not be a dishonourable abdication of the responsibility that was
placed primarily on the federal government by s. 91(24) of the Constitution
Act, 1867?4 7 To avoid this result, a generous and liberal interpretation of
s. 88, in favour of Aboriginal peoples, would limit referential incorporation
to provincial laws that touch on Indianness without infringing Aboriginal
rights.4 8
To sum up, Macfarlane J.A. held that s. 91(24) gives Parliament exclusive
jurisdiction over Aboriginal title lands. This led him to conclude that, since
Confederation, the provincial legislatures have had no power to extinguish
Aboriginal land rights. Moreover, s. 88 of the Indian Act did not confer
authority on the provinces to extinguish those rights, as that would require
47 For judicial confirmation of this responsibility, see supra note 17. Apparently, a major reason
why jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians" was assigned to
Parliament in the first place was that the federal government would be further from local
interests, and so was thought to be more likely to protect and deal fairly with the Aboriginal
peoples (in other words, more likely to uphold the honour of the Crown); see D. Sanders,
"Prior Claims: Aboriginal People in the Constitution of Canada" in S.M. Beck & I. Bernier,
eds., Canada and the New Constitution: The Unfinished Agenda, vol. 1 (Montreal: Institute for
Research on Public Policy, 1983) 225 at 238; P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed.,
vol. 1 (Toronto: Carswell, 1997-) para. 27-2. Also, empowering the provinces to infringe
Aboriginal rights would allow them "to make the federal obligation to Indians more onerous"
by diminishing those rights, avoidance of which was one of the reasons Macfarlane J.A. gave
for concluding that, at the very least, s. 91(24) gives Parliament exclusive jurisdiction over
Aboriginal land rights: Delgamuukw (C.A.), supra note 5 at 535; see text accompanying notes
16-22.
48 This is consistent with Supreme Court decisions in Kruger, supra note 38, and Dick, supra note
31, which involved provincial laws that were not alleged to infringe Aboriginal rights. See
especially Dick, supra note 31 at 315. See also Van der Peet, supra note 46 at 536-37, where
Lamer C.J.C. related the interpretive principle in favour of Aboriginal peoples directly to the
honour of the Crown. For an argument that, as a consequence of s. 35(1) of the Constitution
Act, 1982, s. 88 is constitutionally invalid, see B. Slattery, "First Nations and the Constitution:
A Question of Trust" (1992) 71 Can. Bar Rev. 261 at 284-86. Compare R. v. Alphonse, [1993] 4
C.N.L.R. 19 (B.C.C.A.), where Macfarlane J.A. held that s. 88 is not inconsistent with s. 35(1).
In a judgment concurred in by Taggart, Hutcheon, and Wallace JJ.A., Macfarlane J.A. decided
that provincial laws infringing Aboriginal rights (in this case, a game law) can be referentially
incorporated by s. 88, but only if the infringement is shown to be justified under the Sparrow
test (which the Crown in that case failed to do). Lambert J.A., concurring, did not address the
issue of the constitutional validity of s. 88, as he held that a provincial law that infringes
Aboriginal hunting rights is not referentially incorporated by s. 88 in any case because the
infringement prevents it, in effect, from being a law of general application. Significantly, in
his view, the intent of s. 88 was not to authorize infringements of Aboriginal rights, but to
extend the benefits of provincial legislation to Indians on reserves, which was thought at the
time to be prevented by the theory that reserves were enclaves where provincial laws could
not apply of their own force. Lambert J.A., ibid. at 55, stated:
It seems to me that the legislative purpose of s. 88, when it was enacted [in 1951,
as s. 87], was to overcome the enclave theory with respect to laws that were
broadly general in their application and so to extend to Indians the benefits of
social and commercial legislation which were being extended to all other people
in the province in enactments dealing with such things as credit, insurance, the
family, and the acquisition of goods.
See also R. v. Dick, [19931 4 C.N.L.R. 63 (B.C.C.A.).
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a clear and plain intention which is not revealed by s. 88. However,
Macfarlane J.A. seems to have thought that, at least prior to the enactment
of s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, provincial laws of general application,
either of their own force or by referential incorporation into federal law by
s. 88, could infringe Aboriginal land rights without actually extinguishing
them. For reasons elaborated above, this appears to be inconsistent with his
views on extinguishment. In any event, he did not reach a final conclusion
on the matter of infringement, as, in his words, "[t]he record in this case
and the submissions which have been made are not sufficiently specific to
permit the detailed and complex analysis which is required. I think the
parties are correct in saying that these issues are ripe for negotiation and
reconciliation. "49
II. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
As mentioned earlier, Lamer C.J.C., in the leading Supreme Court judgment
in Delgamuukw, came to virtually the same conclusions as Macfarlane J.A. on
the issue of federal and provincial jurisdiction. He discussed this issue in the
context of the following question: "Did the province [of British Columbia]
have the power to extinguish aboriginal rights after 1871, either under its
own jurisdiction or through the operation of s. 88 of the Indian Act?"50 To
answer this question, he first looked at federal jurisdiction under s. 91(24)
of the Constitution Act, 1867 which, as we have seen, assigned exclusive
jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians" to the
Parliament of Canada.
Separating that assignment of jurisdiction into its two constituent parts,
Lamer C.J.C. examined first the meaning of "Lands reserved for the Indians".
Like Macfarlane J.A., he found the issue of whether those words include lands
held by Aboriginal title as well as Indian reserves to have been settled by the
Privy Council in the St. Catherine's case. Having reached the conclusion that
s. 91(24) "carries with it the jurisdiction to legislate in relation to aboriginal
title," the Chief Justice said, "[ilt follows, by implication, that it also confers
the jurisdiction to extinguish that title." 51 Since that jurisdiction is exclusive,
the provinces have no power to extinguish Aboriginal title directly.
The government of British Columbia tried to avoid this result by arguing
that, by virtue of s. 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the Crown in right of
49 Delgamuukw (C.A.), supra note 5 at 533. To this, Macfarlane J.A. added that, where there are
competing interests, the various parties whose rights might be affected should be represented.
50 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 267.
51 Ibid. at 268.
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the province has the underlying title to lands held by Aboriginal title, and
that "this right of ownership carried with it the right to grant fee simples
which, by implication, extinguish aboriginal title, and so by negative
implication excludes aboriginal title from the scope of s. 91(24)."52 Lamer
C.J.C. rejected this convoluted argument because it failed to take account of
the language of s. 109, which he quoted as follows:
All Lands, Mines, Minerals and Royalties belonging to the several
Provinces of Canada...at the Union.. shall belong to the several
Provinces.. .subject to any Trusts existing in respect thereof, and to
any Interest other than that of the Province in the same. 53
Commenting on this section, the Chief Justice said:
Although that provision vests underlying title in provincial
Crowns, it qualifies provincial ownership by making it subject to
"any Interest other than that of the Province in the same". In St.
Catherine's Milling, the Privy Council held that aboriginal title was
such an interest, and rejected the argument that provincial
ownership operated as a limit on federal jurisdiction. The net
effect of that decision, therefore, was to separate the ownership of
lands held pursuant to aboriginal title from jurisdiction over
those lands. Thus, although on surrender of aboriginal title the
province would take absolute title, jurisdiction to accept surrenders
lies with the federal government. The same can be said of
extinguishment-although on extinguishment of aboriginal
title, the province would take complete title to the land, the
jurisdiction to extinguish lies with the federal government. 54
The significance of this last passage from Lamer C.J.C.'s judgment goes
well beyond the issue of jurisdiction to extinguish Aboriginal title. By
affirming that Aboriginal title is an interest in land within the meaning of
s. 109, the Chief Justice made clear that it is a legally protected property
right. 55 So even if the provinces had jurisdiction to extinguish Aboriginal
title prior to the enactment of s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, exercise
52 Ibid.
53 Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 10; as quoted in Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), ibid. at 268.
54 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), ibid. at 268-69.
55 Other passages from his judgment confirm this. See, e.g., ibid. at 252: "What aboriginal title
confers is the right to the land itself."
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of that jurisdiction would be a violation of the proprietary rights of the
holders of that title. In the absence of clear and plain statutory authority, that
could not be done by issuance of a Crown grant, as the Crown generally does
not have prerogative power to abrogate or derogate from property or other
legal rights.56 Taken to its logical conclusion, the argument of the British
Columbia government would mean that the province could extinguish the
real property rights of anyone in British Columbia simply by granting their
lands to someone else.57 Not since Magna Carta has the Crown had that kind
of power.58
56 See W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1st U.S.A. ed., vol. 1 (Philadelphia:
Robert Bell, 1771) at 141-45; Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed., Supp. 1998, Part 1 (London:
Butterworths, 1998) at 8/20, para. 1062; and McNeil, "Racial Discrimination", supra note 34.
It is fundamental to the rule of law that the Crown cannot infringe legal rights without
statutory authority: see Entick v. Carrington (1765), 2 Wils. K.B. 275, 95 E.R. 807 (C.P.);
Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121. This common law protection prevents the Crown
from seizing property or otherwise infringing legal rights by act of state within its own
dominions: see Walker v. Baird, [1892] A.C. 491 (P.C.); Johnstone v. Pedlar, [1921] 2 A.C. 262
(H.L.); Eshugbayi Eleko v. Government of Nigeria, [1931] A.C. 662 at 671 (P.C.); Attorney-General
v. Nissan, [1970] A.C. 179 (H.L.); Buttes Gas v. Hammer, [1975] Q.B. 557 at 573 (C.A.).
Although in times of war the Crown does have extraordinary power to seize private property
for defence, that still cannot be done without payment of compensation: see Burmah Oil Co.
v. Lord Advocate, [1965] A.C. 75 at 102 (H.L.), where Lord Reid said that, "even at the zenith
of the royal prerogative, no one thought that there was any general rule that the prerogative
could be exercised, even in times of war or imminent danger, by taking property required for
defence without making any payment for it."
57 In its Supreme Court of Canada Factum, 30 March 1997 at 12-17, cross-appealing on the issue
of the province's jurisdiction to extinguish Aboriginal title, British Columbia supported its
remarkable claim of power to extinguish that title by grant by reference to United States v.
Santa Fe Pacific Ry. Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941); Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2] (1992), 175 C.L.R. 1
(Aust. H.C.); and Wik Peoples v. Queensland (1996), 141 A.L.R. 129 (Aust. H.C.). However,
examination of American case law, including the Santa Fe Pacific case, reveals that, ever since
the decision of Marshall C.J. in Johnson v. M'Jntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), the position
in the United States has been that grants of land held by Aboriginal title do not extinguish
that title; rather, they take effect subject to it: see ES. Cohen, "Original Indian Title" (1947)
32 Minnesota L. Rev. 28; K. McNeil, "Extinguishment of Native Title: The High Court and
American Law" (1997) 2 A.I.L.R. 365. As for the Mabo and Wik decisions, they do support
British Columbia's claim, but only by treating Native title in a racially discriminatory way that
does not accord it the same common law protection as non-Indigenous land rights in
Australia: see McNeil, "Racial Discrimination", supra note 34. (Of course, the Delgamuukw
decision makes the extinguishment aspect of those Australian decisions inapplicable in
Canada for division of powers reasons as well, as provincial statutes containing authority to
extinguish Aboriginal title by grant would encroach on exclusive federal jurisdiction: see infra
notes 59-81 and accompanying text.) Moreover, in its Cross-Appeal Factum the province did
not support its claim of power to extinguish Aboriginal title by grant by any post-
Confederation statutory authority (I suspect that one would search in vain for legislation in
any province that would authorize such arbitrary and unprecedented violations of property
rights).
58 Magna Carta, 1215 (Eng.), 17 John, c. 29, provided that "[nlo Freeman shall...be disseised of
his Freehold...but by lawful Judgement of his Peers, or by the law of the Land." As Lord
Parmoor stated in Attorney-General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel, [1920] A.C. 508 at 569 (H.L.),
"[s]ince Magna Carta the estate of a subject in lands or buildings has been protected against
the prerogative of the Crown."
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But as we have seen, Lamer C.J.C. held in Delgamuukw that, since
Confederation, the provinces have lacked even the legislative authority to
extinguish Aboriginal title. In addition to the authority of the St. Catherine's
decision, the Chief Justice used the same policy argument as Macfarlane J.A.,
namely that
separating federal jurisdiction over Indians from jurisdiction
over their lands would have a most unfortunate result-the
government vested with primary constitutional responsibility for
securing the welfare of Canada's aboriginal peoples would find
itself unable to safeguard one of the most central of native
interests-their interest in their lands.5 9
Lamer C.J.C. then went on to extend federal jurisdiction over "Lands
reserved for the Indians" not just to Aboriginal title, but also to Aboriginal
rights in relation to land that fall short of title. An Aboriginal right to fish in
a particular location, for example, may be just as fundamental to Aboriginal
peoples as title to the land itself, so exclusive federal jurisdiction must
include power to legislate in relation to that kind of right as well. 60
Having found "Lands reserved for the Indians" to include all Aboriginal
land rights, Lamer C.J.C. turned to the meaning of "Indians" in s. 91(24).
While acknowledging that the Court has not had occasion in the past to
define the extent of federal jurisdiction over Indians, he said that "at the very
least," it includes a "core of Indianness" which is protected "from provincial
intrusion, through the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity."61 That core
of Indianness, he explained,
encompasses the whole range of aboriginal rights that are protected
by s. 35(1). Those rights include rights in relation to land; that
part of the core derives from s. 91(24)'s reference to "Lands
reserved for the Indians". But those rights also encompass practices,
customs and traditions which are not tied to land as well; that
part of the core can be traced to federal jurisdiction over
"Indians". Provincial governments are prevented from legislating
in relation to both types of aboriginal rights. 62
59 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 269.
60 Ibid.; referring to Adams, supra note 18.
61 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), ibid. at 269.
62 Ibid. at 270.
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Because "[f]aws which purport to extinguish those rights...touch the core of
Indianness which lies at the heart of s. 91(24)," such laws "are beyond the
legislative competence of the provinces to enact." 6
3
Up to this point, we have been examining the portions of Lamer C.J.C.'s
judgment that deal with provincial inability to legislate directly in relation to
Indians or Indian lands, or, to put it another way, to single them out for
special treatment. He went on to acknowledge, however, that "notwithstanding
s. 91(24), provincial laws of general application apply proprio vigore to Indians
and Indian lands." 64 For example, provincial labour relations laws and traffic
laws have been held to apply of their own force on Indian reserves. 65 But the
question the Chief Justice said must be answered for the purposes of
Delgamuukw "is whether the same principle allows provincial laws of general
application to extinguish aboriginal rights." 66 His answer to this was no, for
two reasons.
First, Lamer C.J.C. said that it takes "clear and plain" legislative intent to
extinguish Aboriginal rights, 6 7 and no provincial law could meet that test for
extinguishment without crossing the line into federal jurisdiction. He put it
this way:
My concern is that the only laws with the sufficiently clear and
plain intention to extinguish aboriginal rights would be laws in
relation to Indians and Indian lands. As a result, a provincial law
could never, proprio vigore, extinguish aboriginal rights, because
the intention to do so would take the law outside provincial
jurisdiction. 68
Second, the Chief Justice said that "s.91(24) protects a core of federal
jurisdiction even from provincial laws of general application, through the
operation of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity."69 Aboriginal
rights, he said, "are part of the core of Indianness at the heart of s. 91(24)."70
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Four B Manufacturing, supra note 43; R. v. Francis, 11988] 1 S.C.R. 1025.
66 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 270 [emphasis added].
67 For discussion of this test, see supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
68 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 271.
69 Ibid. [emphasis added].
70 Ibid. Lamer CJ.C. found support for this in his decision in Van der Peet, supra note 46, in
reference to which he said that the Aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) of
the Constitution Act, 1982, were described "as protecting the occupation of land and the
activities which are integral to the distinctive aboriginal culture of the group claiming the
right", ibid.
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So even prior to the enactment of s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, those
rights "could not be extinguished by provincial laws of general application." 71
Lamer C.J.C. then turned to s. 88 of the Indian Act to see whether it
authorizes extinguishment of Aboriginal rights by provincial laws of general
application through referential incorporation of those laws into federal law.
He pointed out that "s.88 does not 'invigorate' provincial laws which are
invalid because they are in relation to Indians and Indian lands." 72 What
s. 88 does, he explained, is extend "the effect of provincial laws of general
application which cannot apply to Indians and Indian lands because they
touch on the Indianness at the core of s. 91(24)." 73 While the reference to
Indian lands in these passages might be taken to imply that s. 88 makes the
included provincial laws applicable to Indian lands as well as to Indians, I
think that would be reading too much into Lamer C.J.C.'s words. We have
seen that, although the Court in Derrickson left open the question of whether
s. 88 makes provincial laws applicable to Indian lands, numerous court
decisions, including decisions of at least three provincial courts of appeal,
have held that the section does not have that effect. 74 It is inconceivable that
the Chief Justice intended to overrule those decisions with such vague language,
without reference to them and without any discussion of the compelling
arguments against such an interpretation. 75
To the question of whether s. 88 authorizes extinguishment of
Aboriginal rights by provincial laws of general application, Lamer C.J.C.
answered in the negative because the section "does not evince the requisite
clear and plain intent" to do that.76 He concluded his short discussion of this
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid. at 272 [emphasis added].
73 Ibid. [emphasis added]; relying on Dick, supra note 31.
74 Supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
75 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. Also, Lamer CJ.C.'s decision in Delgamuukw
(S.C.C.), supra note 1, that Indian lands are not limited to reserves for the purposes of s. 91(24)
in fact weighs against an interpretation of s. 88 that would make provincial laws of general
application applicable to those lands. The provisions of the Indian Act relating to lands
generally apply only to Indian reserves, not to Aboriginal title lands. Moreover, in its
application to "Indians", the Act, and hence s. 88, applies only to those persons who are
within the definition of that term in the Act itself (usually referred to as status Indians); it does
not apply to the whole category of "Indians" in s. 91(24), which includes non-status Indians,
Inuit, and arguably M~tis: see Hogg, supra note 47, paras. 27-3 to 27-4 and at note 64, para.
27-13; Alphonse, supra note 48 at 37-38 per Macfarlane J.A.; and ibid. at 61 per Lambert J.A.
Section 88 cannot be interpreted to make provincial laws apply to Indian lands, including
Aboriginal title lands, without excluding lands held by Aboriginal peoples like the Inuit who
are outside the scope of the Act. This might lead to anomalous and discriminatory results,
which could be avoided by excluding all Aboriginal lands (including reserves) from the reach
of s. 88, an interpretation which is fully justified by the omission of any mention of Indian
lands in the section.
76 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), ibid. at 272.
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issue by adding: "I see nothing in the language of the provision which even
suggests the intention to extinguish aboriginal rights. Indeed, the explicit
reference to treaty rights in s. 88 suggests that the provision was clearly not
intended to undermine aboriginal rights." 77 This passage suggests not only
that s. 88 does not authorize extinguishment of Aboriginal rights, but that it
does not authorize infringement of those rights either, as that too would
"undermine" those rights. As discussed above, this interpretation upholds
the honour of the Crown, 78 is consistent with the Court's jurisprudence on
the section, 79 and accords with both the general principle that legislative
provisions are to be interpreted to preserve vested rights80 and the more
specific principle that statutes relating to Aboriginal peoples are to be construed
generously and liberally, and any ambiguities resolved in their favour.8 1
To sum up, on my reading of Lamer C.J.C.'s discussion of federal and
provincial jurisdiction over Aboriginal rights, including Aboriginal title and
other rights in relation to land, ever since Confederation the provinces have
lacked the power not only to extinguish, but also to infringe, those rights.
Moreover, s. 88 of the Indian Act, while making provincial laws of general
application apply to Indians by referential incorporation, does not authorize
extinguishment of Aboriginal rights. Further, it has been held in numerous
cases that s. 88 does not make any provincial laws apply to Indian lands, but
even if the section did have that effect, it reveals no clear and plain intention
to authorize infringement of Aboriginal title, or indeed of any Aboriginal
rights, whether in relation to land or not.
However, when Lamer C.J.C.'s discussion of federal and provincial
jurisdiction is compared with his discussion of infringement of Aboriginal
rights and the test of justification for infringement in the context of s. 35(1)
of the Constitution Act, 1982, I think that certain inconsistencies emerge. The
Chief Justice began his discussion of infringement as follows: "The aboriginal
rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1), including aboriginal title, are not
absolute. Those rights may be infringed, both by the federal (e.g., Sparrow)
and provincial (e.g., Cte) governments. However, s. 35(1) requires that those
infringements satisfy the test of justification." 82
77 Ibid.
78 See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
79 See supra note 48.
80 See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
81 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
82 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 260.
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Both Sparrow83 and C6te84 involved Aboriginal fishing rights, not
Aboriginal title to land. In C6te, the accused Algonquins were charged, inter
alia, with entering a controlled harvest zone without paying the fee required
for motor vehicle access by Quebec's Regulation respecting controlled zones.85
Lamer C.J.C., writing the main judgment, found that the accused had
established that they had an existing, site-specific Aboriginal right to fish for
food within the controlled zone. Turning to the question of infringement, he
decided that the provision in question did not infringe that right, as what it
imposed was a user fee, applied to maintain the roads and facilities in the
controlled zone, rather than a revenue-generating tax. As the fee actually
improved transportation within the zone, he found that it "effectively
facilitates rather than restricts the constitutional rights of the appellants." 86
For our purposes, what is interesting-and in my view disturbing-about
the CtO decision is the ease with which the Chief Justice concluded that the
justification test applies to provincial infringements of Aboriginal rights. He
dealt with this in the following paragraph:
In Sparrow, the Court set out the applicable framework for
identifying the infringement of an aboriginal right or treaty right
under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. It should be noted
that the test in Sparrow was originally elucidated in the context of
a federal regulation which allegedly infringed an aboriginal right.
The majority of recent cases which have subsequently invoked
the Sparrow framework have similarly done so against the backdrop
of a federal statute or regulation. See, e.g., Gladstone.87 But it is
quite clear that the Sparrow test applies where a provincial law is
alleged to have infringed an aboriginal or treaty right in a manner
which cannot be justified: Badger,88 supra at para. 85 (application
of Sparrow test to provincial statute which violated a treaty right).
The text and purpose of s. 35(1) do not distinguish between
federal and provincial laws which restrict aboriginal or treaty
rights, and they should both be subject to the same standard of
constitutional scrutiny.89
83 Supra note 44.
84 Supra note 18.
85 R.R.Q. 1981, 370 (supp.), as amended by O.C. 1283-84, 6 June 1984, G.O.Q. 1984.11.2496,
made under An Act respecting the conservation and development of wildlife, S.Q. 1983, c. 39.
86 C6t, supra note 18 at 189.
87 R. v. Gladstone, 11996] 2 S.C.R. 723.
88 Supra note 46.
89 Cte, supra note 18 at 185 [footnotes added].
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What is missing here is any mention of the question of whether the
provinces have constitutional authority to infringe Aboriginal and treaty
rights, given exclusive federal jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands reserved
for the Indians". 90 This division of powers question logically precedes the
issue of the applicability of the Sparrow test, as that test obviously is not
available to justify infringements by provincial laws that encroach on federal
jurisdiction. 91
This takes us back to the Badger decision, which Lamer C.J.C. relied on for
his conclusion in C6t6 that the Sparrow test applies to provincial legislation.
In Badger, three Treaty 8 Cree Indians were tried on various charges of hunting
moose out of season and without licences, contrary to provisions of the
Alberta Wildlife Act.92 They relied on their treaty right to hunt, para. 12 of the
Alberta Natural Resources Transfer Agreement (NRTA), 93 and the constitutional
protection accorded to their treaty rights by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982. A major issue in the case was whether their treaty right to hunt had
been extinguished and replaced by para. 12 of the NRTA, which provides:
In order to secure to the Indians of the Province the continuance
of the supply of game and fish for their support and subsistence,
Canada agrees that the laws respecting game in force in the
Province from time to time shall apply to the Indians within the
boundaries thereof, provided, however, that the said Indians shall
have the right, which the Province hereby assures to them, of
hunting, trapping and fishing game and fish for food at all seasons
of the year on all unoccupied Crown lands and on any other
lands to which the said Indians may have a right of access.
Cory J., writing the principal judgment, decided that the treaty right had
been modified, but not extinguished, by para. 12 of the NRTA, and so was
90 Note that Lamer C.J.C. did not even mention s. 88 of the Indian Act, let alone rely on it, in
the portion of his judgment dealing with provincial infringement of Aboriginal rights. He did,
however, refer to s. 88 when he dealt with the issue of a possible treaty right to fish and the
protection treaty rights are accorded by the section: see, infra notes 96-97 and accompanying
text.
91 See Slattery, supra note 48 at 284-85. In Alphonse, supra note 48 at 37, Macfarlane J.A. stated
that s. 35(1) analysis "stands as a separate and subsequent review, which is properly done after
division of powers issues have been resolved" [emphasis added].
92 S.A. 1984, c. W-9.1.
93 Schedule (2) to the Constitution Act, 1930 (U.K.), 20-21 Geo. 5, c. 26, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985,
App. II, No. 26. Note that the main purpose of this agreement, like equivalent agreements
with Manitoba and Saskatchewan that were also given constitutional status by the
Constitution Act, 1930, was to transfer Crown lands and resources from the federal to the
provincial governments, thereby putting the three prairie provinces in the same position as
the other provinces in this respect.
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recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. After finding
that this modified treaty right was infringed by the licensing provision of the
Wildlife Act, he turned to the issue of justification:
In my view justification of provincial regulations enacted pursuant
to the NRTA should meet the same test for justification of treaty
rights that was set out in Sparrow. The reason for this is obvious.
The effect of para. 12 of the NRTA is to place the Provincial
government in exactly the same position which the Federal
Crown formerly occupied. Thus the Provincial government has
the same duty not to infringe unjustifiably the hunting right
provided by Treaty No. 8 as modified by the NRTA. 94
From this, it is apparent that the reason why Cory J. thought Alberta could
avail itself of the Sparrow test of justification (unsuccessfully, as it turned out)
was that the province had been given specific constitutional authority, by
virtue of the NRTA, to legislate with respect to Indian hunting.95 Absent that
94 Badger, supra note 46 at 820. For commentary, particularly on the applicability of the justification
test to infringements of treaty rights, see L.I. Rotman, "Defining Parameters: Aboriginal
Rights, Treaty Rights, and the Sparrow Justificatory Test" (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 149.
95 Note, however, that although the NRTA has been in force since 1930 and numerous Supreme
Court decisions involving the application of para. 12 have been decided, to my knowledge it
had never been suggested by the Court prior to Badger that provincial infringements of the
rights that are constitutionally guaranteed by that section could be justified: see discussion of
the case law in K. McNeil, Indian Hunting, Trapping and Fishing Rights in the Prairie Provinces of
Canada (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1983) at 20-45. On the
contrary, in R. v. Strongquill (1953), 8 W.W.R. (N.S.) 247 at 260 (Sask. C.A.), Gordon J.A. said
in relation to para. 12 of the Saskatchewan NRTA (which is the same as para. 12 of the Alberta
NRTA) that "Indians should be preserved before moose." This passage was cited with approval
by Dickson J. (as he then was) in the unanimous judgment in Kruger, supra note 38 at 112: see
infra note 97. See also Prince and Myron v. R., [1964] S.C.R. 81, where the Supreme Court
disregarded the conservation concerns expressed by the majority in the Manitoba Court of
Appeal (1962), 40 W.W.R. 234. Compare R. v. Horseman, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901, where Cory J.
referred to conservation in reaching his conclusion that the words "for food" in para. 12
exclude commercial hunting. He did not, however, suggest that conservation could be used to
justify infringements of Indian hunting that was for the purpose of obtaining food. On the
contrary, ibid. at 934 he approvingly quoted and emphasized a statement by Laskin J. (as he
then was) in Cardinal, supra note 40 at 722, regarding the "true effect" of para. 12: "Although
inelegantly expressed s. 12 does not expand provincial legislative power but contracts it"
(query how Cory J. was able to reconcile with this statement his decision in Badger that
provincial infringements of para. 12 rights can be justified).
The irony of Badger is that constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal and treaty rights by
s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 has actually resulted in a reduction of the protection
accorded to Indian hunting, trapping, and fishing rights by para. 12 of the NRTA. This has
happened because the enactment of s. 35(1) led to creation by the Supreme Court in Sparrow,
supra note 44, of a test to justify infringements of s. 35(1) rights. Prior to that, no one seems
to have imagined that infringements of the constitutional rights guaranteed by para. 12 could
be justified. But the creation of the justification test in Sparrow provided the Court in Badger
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kind of authority, it is difficult to understand how the provinces could have
any power to infringe Aboriginal or treaty rights, given exclusive federal
jurisdiction under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. If constitutional
authority to infringe those rights is lacking, no justification is possible.
In Ct6, Lamer C.J.C. pointed out that, in making provincial laws of
general application apply to Indians subject, inter alia, to the terms of any
treaty, s. 88 of the Indian Act does not expressly allow for justification of
provincial infringements of treaty rights.9 6 Ironically, given the Chief Justice's
view that the Sparrow test is available to justify provincial infringements of
Aboriginal and treaty rights under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, it
may be that treaty rights are more fully protected under federal legislation
than under the Constitution. But instead of leading Lamer C.J.C. to question
the applicability of the justification test to provincial infringements in the
context of s. 35(1), that anomalous result made him ponder whether an
equivalent test should also be made available under s. 88. 9 7 While leaving the
matter open, he suggested that a legislative solution might be appropriate.
By taking the decision in Badger that the Sparrow test is available to
justify provincial infringements of treaty rights out of the context of para. 12
of the NRTA and extending its availability to provincial legislation generally,
with an opportunity to apply the same test to para. 12, thereby diluting the constitutional
protection of the NRTA. For more detailed discussion of the pre-Badger case law in relation to
this issue, see K. McNeil, "Envisaging Constitutional Space for Aboriginal Governments"
(1993) 19 Queen's L.J. 95 at 126-29.
96 C6te, supra note 18 at 192.
97 If made available by the Court, that would involve rejecting the view expressed by Dickson J.
in Kruger, supra note 38 at 112, in relation to s. 88, that if it could be shown that
the Province has acted in such a way as to oppose conservation and Indian
claims to the detriment of the latter-to 'preserve moose before Indians' in the
words of Gordon J.A. in R. v. Strongquill [supra note 951-it might very well be
concluded that the effect of the legislation is to cross the line demarking laws of
general application from other enactments.
See also Alphonse, supra note 48 at 60 per Lambert J.A.
Moreover, in Simon v. The Queen, supra note 44 at 413, Dickson C.J.C., for a unanimous
Court, explicitly rejected that provincial game laws for the purpose of conservation applied
to an Indian who was exercising his treaty right to hunt in Nova Scotia, as "it is clear that
under s. 88 of the Indian Act provincial legislation cannot restrict native treaty rights. If conflict
arises, the terms of the treaty prevail."
In Badger, supra note 46 at 818-19, Cory J. quoted this passage and then distinguished
Simon:
The Simon case dealt with Provincial regulations which the government attempted
to justify under s. 88 of the Indian Act. By contrast, in this case, para. 12 of the
NRTA specifically provides that the provincial government may make regulations
for conservation purposes, which affect the Treaty rights to hunt.
So while Cory J. was willing to extend the application of the justification test to provincial
laws in the context of the NRTA, he acknowledged its inapplicability in the context of s. 88.
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Lamer CJ.C. in Cbte ignored the rationale Cory J. gave for making the test
available in Badger. Without the kind of specific constitutional authority
provided by para. 12, provincial infringements of Aboriginal and treaty rights
should be ultra vires. This conclusion seems even more evident since Lamer
C.J.C. decided in Delgamuukw that "aboriginal rights are part of the core
of Indianness at the heart of s. 91(24)" of the Constitution Act, 1867.98 As he
concluded from this that, even prior to 1982, "they could not be extinguished
by provincial laws of general application," 99 they should not be infringeable
by provincial legislation either, because that too would encroach on exclusive
federal jurisdiction.
With all due respect, it seems to me that in Delgamuukw, Lamer C.J.C. did
not really have his own views on exclusive federal jurisdiction in mind when
he wrote the part of his judgment dealing with infringement of Aboriginal
title. After making the general statement quoted above on infringement by
federal and provincial governments, 100 he looked at the components of the
justification test itself. The test has two parts. First, the government attempting
to justify the infringement must show it to be "in furtherance of a legislative
objective that is compelling and substantial." 10 1 Second, the infringement
must be "consistent with the special fiduciary relationship between the
Crown and aboriginal peoples." 102 The Chief Justice discussed both parts of
the test in a general way in the context of the Sparrowlo3 and Gladstone10 4
decisions, both of which involved infringement of Aboriginal fishing rights
by federal legislation. He then said that "[t]he general principles governing
98 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 271.
99 Ibid.
100 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
101 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note I at 260.
102 Ibid. at 261. How any infringement of Aboriginal rights can be consistent with the fiduciary
relationship is puzzling, as it seems to involve violation of the basic principle that a fiduciary
is bound to act in the best interests of the person(s) to whom the fiduciary duty is owed.
Perhaps the explanation is that the Crown has other obligations (e.g., to the Canadian public
generally) that can conflict with the duty owed to Aboriginal peoples, so the duty has to be
tempered for that reason. This is achieved in part by describing the Crown/Aboriginal
relationship as suigeneris (see Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 at 385, 387 per Dickson
J.), permitting the courts to apply fiduciary principles with flexibility. For discussion of conflict
of interest and the sui generis nature of the relationship, see L.I. Rotman, Parallel Paths:
Fiduciary Doctrine and the Crown-Native Relationship in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1996) at 264-72. See also J. Borrows & L.I. Rotman, "The Sui Generis Nature of Aboriginal
Rights: Does It Make a Difference?" (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 9. For a pre-Delgamuukw (S.C.C.)
discussion of the justification test, see K. McNeil, "How Can Infringements of The
Constitutional Rights of Aboriginal Peoples Be Justified?" (1997) 8 Const. Forum 33.
103 Supra note 44.
104 Supra note 87.
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justification laid down in Sparrow, and embellished by Gladstone, operate
with respect to infringements of aboriginal title."1 0
5
Regarding the application of the first part of the test to infringements of
Aboriginal title, Lamer C.J.C. stated:
In the wake of Gladstone, the range of legislative objectives that
can justify the infringement of aboriginal title is fairly broad.
Most of these objectives can be traced to the reconciliation of the
prior occupation of North America by aboriginal peoples with the
assertion of Crown sovereignty, which entails the recognition
that "distinctive aboriginal societies exist within, and are a part
of, a broader social, political and economic community"
([Gladstone, supra note 87] at para. 73). In my opinion, the
development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric
power, the general economic development of the interior of
British Columbia, protection of the environment or endangered
species, the building of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign
populations to support those aims, are the kinds of objectives that
are consistent with this purpose and, in principle, can justify the
infringement of aboriginal title. Whether a particular measure or
government act can be explained by reference to one of those
objectives, however, is ultimately a question of fact that will have
to be examined on a case-by-case basis. 106
For the purposes of this article, what is remarkable about this passage is that
most of the activities mentioned-things like agriculture, forestry, and
mining-are primarily within provincial jurisdiction by virtue of the
constitutional division of powers. With respect, the Chief Justice seems to
have assumed that British Columbia (and seemingly the other provinces as
well) has constitutional authority to infringe Aboriginal title for these kinds
of purposes, without considering whether that authority is consistent with
the conclusion reached elsewhere in his judgment that the Canadian
Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction over Aboriginal title.
This discrepancy is all the more glaring when account is taken of Lamer
C.J.C.'s description of Aboriginal title in Delgamuukw. He began his discussion
of this by affirming that Aboriginal title is sui generis, in the sense that it is
105 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 263.
106 Ibid. at 263-64 [emphasis in original].
Aboriginal Title and the Division of Powers 455
unlike other interests in land recognized by the common law. Its uniqueness
stems in part from its dual source in occupation of land prior to assertion of
British sovereignty and in pre-existing systems of Aboriginal law. As a result,
"its characteristics cannot be completely explained by reference either to the
common law rules of real property or to the rules of property found in
aboriginal legal systems. As with other aboriginal rights, it must be understood
by reference to both common law and aboriginal perspectives." 107
Two sui generis features of Aboriginal title mentioned by the Chief Justice
are its inalienability, other than by surrender to the Crown, 108 and its
communal nature. Regarding the latter, he said: "Aboriginal title cannot be
held by individual aboriginal persons; it is a collective right to land held by
all members of an aboriginal nation. Decisions with respect to that land are
also made by that community." 109
Turning to the actual content of Aboriginal title, the Chief Justice said
that it can be summarized by two propositions. First, "aboriginal title
encompasses the right to exclusive use and occupation of the land held
pursuant to that title for a variety of purposes, which need not be aspects of
those aboriginal practices, customs and traditions which are integral to
distinctive aboriginal cultures." 1 10 Where Aboriginal title is concerned,
Lamer C.J.C. thus modified the test he laid out in Van derPeet, by which other
Aboriginal rights are limited to practices, customs, and traditions integral to
the distinctive Aboriginal culture in question.11 1 Second, there is an inherent
limit on Aboriginal title that prohibits use of the land "in a manner that is
irreconcilable with the nature of the attachment to the land which forms the basis
of the group's claim to aboriginal title." 112 This restriction is designed to maintain
107 Ibid. at 241.
108 Ibid. As we have seen, Lamer CJ.C. made clear that jurisdiction to accept surrenders lies with
the federal government: see text accompanying note 54.
109 Ibid. at 242. For discussion of the relationship between the communal nature of Aboriginal
title and self-government, see McNeil, "Aboriginal Rights in Canada", supra note 2.
110 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), ibid. at 243.
111 Van der Peet, supra note 46. For commentary, see J. Borrows, "The Trickster: Integral to a
Distinctive Culture" (1997) 8 Const. Forum 27; L.I. Rotman, "Hunting for Answers in a
Strange Kettle of Fish: Unilateralism, Paternalism and Fiduciary Rhetoric in Badger and Van der
Peet" (1997) 8 Const. Forum 40; L.I. Rotman, "Creating a Still-Life Out of Dynamic Objects:
Rights Reductionism at the Supreme Court of Canada" (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 1; J. Gray, "0
Canada!-Van der Peet as Guidance on the Construction of Native Title Rights" (1997) 2
A.I.L.R. 18; K. Gallagher-Mackay, "Interpreting Self-Government: Approaches to Building
Cultural Authority" [1997] 4 C.N.L.R. 1; R.L. Barsh & J.Y. Henderson, "The Supreme Court's
Van der Peet Trilogy: Naive Imperialism and Ropes of Sand" (1997) 42 McGill LJ. 993; K. McNeil,
"Reduction by Definition: The Supreme Court's Treatment of Aboriginal Rights in 1996"
(1997) 5: 3 & 4 Canada Watch 60; McNeil, "What's The Connection?", supra note 2; and
McNeil, "Aboriginal Rights in Canada", supra note 2.
112 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 246 [emphasis in original].
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the continuity of an Aboriginal community's relationship with its lands in
the future. In Lamer C.J.C.'s words, "uses of the lands that would threaten
that future relationship are, by their very nature, excluded from the content
of aboriginal title." 113 However, he emphasized that this is not
a limitation that restricts the use of the land to those activities
that have traditionally been carried out on it. That would amount
to a legal strait-jacket on aboriginal peoples who have a legitimate
legal claim to the land. The approach I have outlined above allows
for a full range of uses of the land, subject only to an overarching
limit, defined by the special nature of the aboriginal title in that
land.114
It is not my intention in this article to analyze the Chief Justice's general
description of Aboriginal title.115 Instead, I want to focus on his conclusion
that "aboriginal title encompasses the right to exclusive use and occupation
of the land. ' ' 116 The inherent limit described above may place some restrictions
on the range of uses the holders of Aboriginal title may make of their lands,
but it does not diminish the exclusivity of their right to use and occupation.
117
As Lamer C.J.C. said, "[e]xclusivity, as an aspect of aboriginal title, vests in
the aboriginal community which holds the ability to exclude others from the
lands held pursuant to that title." 1 18 So any intrusion on their lands, unless
authorized by law, would be a violation of these rights and an actionable
trespass.
The Chief Justice nonetheless said that this right to exclusive use and
occupation can be intruded on by governments, as long as the action can be
justified under the Sparrow test. It needs to be kept in mind that what he is
envisaging here is infringement, not just of property rights, but of property
rights that are constitutionally protected by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982. He nonetheless suggested that "conferral of fee simples for agriculture,
and of leases and licences for forestry and mining" may be justifiable
infringements of Aboriginal title if they "reflect the prior occupation of
aboriginal title lands." 119 This implies that governments can justifiably infringe
113 Ibid. at 247.
114 Ibid. at 249.
115 For a preliminary look at this, see McNeil, "Aboriginal Rights in Canada", supra note 2.
116 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note I at 243. See text accompanying note 110.
117 To give an analogy, nuisance and zoning laws restrict the uses that fee simple landholders may
make of their lands but do not affect the exclusivity of their right to use and occupation.
118 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 258. See also ibid. at 259: "Exclusive possession is the
right to exclude others."
119 Ibid. at 264.
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Aboriginal title by creating private interests in land that are inconsistent with
Aboriginal titleholders' rights to exclusive use and occupation. With all due
respect, this flies in the face of the protection the common law has always
accorded to property rights, and makes the constitutionalization of
Aboriginal title by s. 35(1) virtually meaningless. 120
When exclusive federal jurisdiction in relation to Aboriginal title is
combined with Lamer C.J.C.'s description of the content of that title as the
right to exclusive use and occupation, provincial authority to infringe
Aboriginal title seems to be excluded. In Derrickson, the Supreme Court was
faced with the issue of whether the provisions of Part 3 of the British
Columbia Family Relations Act 12 1 relating to division of family assets applied
to lands on an Indian reserve. The appellant argued that "the pith and substance
of the Family Relations Act is the division of matrimonial property, not the use
of Indian lands" and that the Act "in no way encroaches on the exclusive
federal jurisdiction as to the use of Indian lands." 122 Chouinard J., for the
Court, rejected this argument. He expressly agreed with the following
statement which he quoted from the Attorney General of Canada's factum:
In essence, Part 3 of the Family Relations Act is legislation which
regulates who may own or possess land and other property. Its true
nature and character is to regulate the right to the beneficial use of
property and its revenues and the disposition thereof. 123
He accordingly held that the provisions of that Part, though of general
application, could not apply of their own force to reserve lands, as the "right
to possession of lands on an Indian reserve is manifestly of the very essence
120 Aboriginal title has constitutional protection that is not enjoyed by non-Aboriginal property
rights in Canada, and so it should be much more secure against government interference. But
even apart from its constitutional status, Aboriginal title is entitled to the legal protection
against infringement accorded to all property rights by the common law: see McNeil, "Racial
Discrimination", supra note 34, especially at 182-90. Indeed, at least since Magna Carta,
property has been a fundamental common law right: see supra notes 56, 58. Undoubtedly,
there would be a public outcry in British Columbia if the legislature attempted to make a law
authorizing the taking of privately-owned lands by conferral of fee simple interests on other
individuals or of forestry or mining leases on private corporations (this would require clear
and plain legislation: see text accompanying notes 34-38). Yet Lamer C.J.C. seems to think
this would be acceptable where Aboriginal title is concerned, despite the fact that it has
constitutional protection not enjoyed by other property rights. For further discussion, see
K. McNeil, Defining Aboriginal Title in the 90's: Has the Supreme Court Finally Got It Right?
(Toronto: Robarts Centre for Canadian Studies, York University), forthcoming.
121 R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 121.
122 Derrickson (S.C.C.), supra note 40 at 294.
123 Ibid. at 295 [emphasis added].
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of the federal exclusive legislative power under s. 91(24) of the Constitution
Act, 1867."124
By holding that Aboriginal title amounts to a right of exclusive use and
occupation and that Aboriginal title lands are "Lands reserved for the
Indians" for the purposes of s. 91(24), the Delgamuukw decision has extended
the application of Derrickson to those lands. So any provincial legislation
which regulates "the right to the beneficial use of property" or "who may
own or possess land" 12 5 cannot apply of its own force to Aboriginal title
lands. Moreover, provincial laws that do not purport to transfer rights of use
or occupation, but do limit the ways property owners can use their lands,
have to be read down so that they do not apply to Aboriginal title lands. In
the Peace Arch decision, referred to earlier, the British Columbia Court of
Appeal held that zoning bylaws and building codes made by a municipality
under provincial statutory authority, and certain regulations made under the
provincial Health Act, 126 "are directed to the use of land." 127 MacLean J.A.,
for the Court, said that it follows from this:
[Ihf these lands are "lands reserved for the Indians" within the
meaning of that expression as found in sec. 91(24) of the B.N.A.
Act, 1867 [now the Constitution Act, 1867], that provincial or
municipal legislation purporting to regulate the use of these
"lands reserved for the Indians" is an unwarranted invasion of the
124 Ibid. at 296. Chouinard J. went on to consider whether s. 88 of the Indian Act referentially
incorporated the provisions, and held that it did not, as they conflicted with provisions of the
Indian Act relating to possession of reserve lands (as we have seen, he did not decide whether
s. 88 even extends to provincial laws relating to land: see supra notes 40-45 and accompanying
text). See also Paul v. Paul, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 306 [hereinafter Paul (S.C.C.)]. For commentary, see
R.H. Bartlett, "Indian Self-Government, the Equality of the Sexes, and Application of
Provincial Matrimonial Property Laws" (1986) 5 Can. J. Fam. L. 188; M.E. Turpel,
"Home/Land" (1992) 10 Can. J. Fam. L. 17.
125 Derrickson (S.C.C.), supra note 40 at 295: see text accompanying note 124.
126 R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 170.
127 Peace Arch, supra note 41 at 383. Compare Brantford (Township) v. Doctor, [1996] 1 C.N.L.R. 49
at 53 (Ont. Gen. Div.), where Kent J. distinguished Peace Arch, and applied provisions of the
Building Code Act, S.O. 1992, c. 23, and regulations thereunder, requiring building permits and
regulating swimming pools, to Indian lands. Under the heading "Public Policy", he said:
The societal interest sought to be protected by the provincial legislation is the
safety and health of all inhabitants of the province.... There should be no enclave
where some persons are left unprotected because others are not required to
comply with codified safe and healthy building and construction practices. The
legislation applies directly and specifically to conduct. It only incidentally relates to
land [emphasis added].
This decision is justifiable if the legislation, in pith and substance, is in relation to safety and
health rather than use of land: see, infra notes 135-41 and accompanying text. However, Kent
J.'s decision to that effect is debatable and seems to me to be inconsistent with Peace Arch.
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exclusive legislative jurisdiction of Parliament to legislate with
respect to "lands reserved for the Indians".
128
Peace Arch was cited with apparent approval by the Supreme Court in
Cardinal,129 and was applied by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in its
decision in Derrickson.
130
Other cases since Peace Arch have affirmed that provincial laws of general
application relating to use of land cannot apply to lands that are under
exclusive federal jurisdiction by virtue of s. 91(24).131 For instance, in Isaac
the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, Appeal Division, relied on Peace Arch to
conclude that the Canadian Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction over Indian
128 Peace Arch, supra note 41 at 383.
129 See supra note 41. See also Smith (S.C.C.), supra note 42 at 565-67.
130 Derrickson (C.A.), supra note 40, affirmed Derrickson (S.C.C.), supra note 40.
131 Western Industrial Contractors Ltd. v. Sarcee Developments Ltd. (1979), 98 D.L.R. (3d) 424, might
appear to be an exception. In that case, a two-to-one majority of the Alberta Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, held that provincial builders' lien legislation applied to a leasehold held
by an Indian-owned corporation on a reserve, permitting a contractor to file a lien against the
leasehold. The majority decided that, as the corporation was not an "Indian" within the
meaning of the Indian Act, the provincial legislation applied to the leasehold interest, which was
held not to be Indian land within the scope of s. 91(24). However, the legislation could not
apply to the Indian band's reversionary interest, as that was still Indian land under exclusive
federal jurisdiction. While Peace Arch was cited and lamely distinguished because the legislation
in question there related to land use, the two decisions do seem to be inconsistent with one
another, as Peace Arch also involved a leasehold interest in reserve lands, held by two non-
Indian corporations. The Sarcee decision has been described as "controversial" and "legally
very doubtful": Sanders, supra note 45 at 157. Moreover, it also appears to conflict with Palm
Dairies, supra note 42. But in any case, the application of Sarcee is limited in two important
respects: (1) it only applies where a non-Indian holds an interest in Indian land; and (2) given
that Peace Arch was distinguished because it involved land use, apparently Sarcee is inapplicable
where the provincial legislation relates to use of Indian land, even by a non-Indian
leaseholder.
Compare Re Stony Plain Indian Reserve No. 135, [1982] 1 C.N.L.R. 133 at 149-50, where
the Alberta Court of Appeal considered both Peace Arch and Sarcee, and, while expressing
"some difficulty" with the conclusion in the former case regarding the inapplicability of
provincial laws to the leasehold, said that "[i]nsofar as the Peace Arch decision recognized that
provincial legislation relating to use could be inapplicable as inconsistent with the reversionary
interest [held by the Indian band], we express no disagreement." The Court added, ibid. at
151, that "[wie accept the general proposition that provincial legislation relating to use of
reserve lands is inapplicable to lands that are found to be reserved for Indians." As authority,
the Court cited Cardinal, supra note 40 at 705, where Martland J., referring to Peace Arch with-
apparent approval, said that "[o]nce it was determined that the lands remained lands reserved
for the Indians, provincial legislation relating to their use was not applicable." See also Paul
v. Paul, [19851 2 C.N.L.R. 93 at 97 (B.C.C.A.), affirmed Paul (S.C.C.), supra note 124, where
Seaton J.A. used this same quotation from Cardinal to support his decision that s. 77 of the
Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 121, whereby an interim order can be made for exclusive
occupation of a matrimonial home, does not apply on an Indian reserve because such an
order gives "a right of occupancy" and "deals with the use of the land," which are matters of
exclusive federal jurisdiction.
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hunting on reserves because hunting is a use of the land. MacKeigan C.J.N.S.
elaborated as follows on the meaning of use of land:
To shoot a rabbit, deer or grouse on land especially Indian reserve
land, is as much a use of that land as to cut a tree on that land, or
to mine minerals, extract oil from the ground, or farm that land,
or, as in the Peace Arch case, supra, erect a building on that land-
all of which are activities unquestionably exclusively for the
federal government to regulate. 132
However, not every activity conducted on reserve land is a use of the land
that will attract exclusive federal jurisdiction under s. 91(24). For example, in
Four B Manufacturing 33 a majority of the Supreme Court held that a business
which made shoes, although conducted in a building on a reserve, was subject
to the Ontario Labour Relations Act. 134 This is because the making of shoes is
not a use of land as such, nor are provincial laws governing employer-
employee relations generally directed at land use. 135 So provincial laws can
apply on Indian lands, as long as they are not in pith and substance in
relation to land. 136 Thus, in R. v. Francis, La Forest J., for a unanimous Court,
132 Supra note 42 at 469. For commentary on Isaac, see McNeil, Indian Hunting, Trapping and
Fishing Rights, supra note 95 at 14-17. Compare Francis, supra note 65 at 1028, where La Forest J.
said that "[iun Kruger v. The Queen ... this Court held that general provincial legislation relating
to hunting applies on reserves, a matter which is obviously far more closely related to the
Indian way of life than driving motor vehicles" [emphasis added]. This is a puzzling statement,
as in Kruger the accused were in fact hunting off their reserve (see supra note 38 at 106, 111,
from which it appears that the fact they were hunting off their reserve was relevant to the
decision), and the provincial game law in question was held to apply to them as a result of
s. 88 of the Indian Act. Moreover, La Forest J.'s obiter statement is hard to reconcile with
Cardinal, supra note 40, on which he also relied. In Cardinal at 708, Martland J. held that, as
provincial game laws that did not relate to Indians qua Indians would have applied of their
own force to Indians off reserves prior to the enactment of para. 12 of the NRTA in 1930, in
order to achieve the paragraph's purpose of securing the continuance of the supply of game
for the Indians' support and subsistence the federal government "agreed to the imposition of
Provincial controls over hunting and fishing, which, previously, the Province might not have
had the power to impose." He accordingly decided that para. 12 had the effect of making
provincial game laws apply to Indians on reserves in Alberta, subject to the proviso that the
province cannot interfere with their right to hunt and fish for food on reserve lands, as those
are lands to which they have a right of access within the meaning of para. 12.
133 Supra note 43.
134 R.S.O. 1970, c. 232.
135 This meant that the provincial legislation did not encroach on federal jurisdiction over "Lands
reserved for the Indians". But the majority held as well that there was no encroachment either
on federal jurisdiction over the other subject matter in s. 91(24), namely "Indians", as the
legislation did not touch on "Indianness" or Indian status.
136 And as long as they are not in relation to Indians: see text accompanying notes 24, 61-62, 68-
72; Cardinal, supra note 40 at 703 per Martland J.; and Four B Manufacturing, supra note 43 at
1048-49 per Beetz J.
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held that, "in the absence of conflicting federal legislation, provincial motor
vehicle laws of general application apply ex proprio vigore on Indian
reserves." 13 7 Obviously, in pith and substance, such laws relate to the safe
operation of motor vehicles, not to land use. The main issue to be resolved,
therefore, in determining the applicability of provincial laws of general
application on Indian reserves is whether or not those laws are in relation to
land or land use. If not (and as long as they do not touch on
"Indianness" 138), these laws will apply there of their own force. 139 But, if
they are in relation to land-especially if they relate to use or occupation of
land-they will not apply to reserve lands. 140 On this, the cases examined
137 Francis, supra note 65 at 1028.
138 See text accompanying notes 31, 70-73.
139 See Rempel Brothers Concrete Ltd. v. Chilliwack (District) (1994), 88 B.C.L.R. (2d) 209 at 214
(B.C.C.A.), where Hinkson J.A., for the Court, held that a municipal by-law regulating soil
removal and deposit in order to pay for damage to roads caused by trucks moving the soil
applies on an Indian reserve because it "has only an incidental effect, if any, on Indian lands"
and does not "regulate use of land". In Fiddler, supra note 42, Noble J. held that starting a fire
on an Indian reserve does not affect Indianness or amount to a use of the land. Accordingly,
he held at 127 that the Prairie and Forest Fires Act, S.S. 1982-83, c. P-22.1, applies ex proprio
vigore to an Indian who starts a fire on a reserve in contravention of the Act, which "is clearly
a safety law". Compare R. v. Sinclair, [1978] 6 W.W.R. 37 (Man. Prov. Ct.), where the opposite
conclusion was reached with respect to equivalent Manitoba fire prevention legislation.
140 Derrickson (S.C.C.), supra note 40; Paul (S.C.C.), supra note 124; Peace Arch, supra note 41; Isaac,
supra note 42; Palm Dairies, supra note 42; Re Stony Plain, supra note 131. See also Millbrook
Indian Band (S.C.), supra note 42 (affirmed in Millbrook Indian Band (A.D.), supra note 42,
without dealing with the constitutional issue), where Morrison J., relying on Peace Arch and
Isaac, held that the Residential Tenancies Act, 1970 (N.S.), c. 13, is in relation to use of land,
and so does not apply on Indian reserves. Compare Park Mobile Homes, supra note 42, where
Farris C.J.B.C., for the Court, held that a provision of the Landlord and Tenant Act, S.B.C. 1974,
c. 45, restricting the right of a landlord to raise rent for residential premises, applies to rental
of a mobile home pad on an Indian reserve. The Chief Justice distinguished Peace Arch because
the legislation in question in that case related to use of land, whereas he found that the
specific provision in question in the case before him did not. For informative discussion of
what use of land means in this context, see Hughes, supra note 45 at 97-103.
Obviously, provincial laws that are specifically directed at Indian lands, and so not of
general application, will not just be read down to make them inapplicable to those lands
(which is what the courts did in the above case where provincial laws of general application
were found to relate to use or occupation of lands), but will be struck down as ultra vires. In
Hopton v. Pamajewon, [1994] 2 C.N.L.R. 61 at 70, leave to appeal refused (sub nom. Attorney
General for the Province of Ontario v. Pamajewon), [1994] 2 S.C.R. v, the Ontario Court of Appeal
unanimously held that s. 257 of the Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 302, providing interalia that
"all roads passing through Indian lands.. are common and public highways,"
cannot mean that roads on or passing through Indian lands become public
highways by the simple operation of that section. This would be legislation in
relation to a matter coming within the exclusive legislative authority of
Parliament and, as such, would be ultra vires. Section 257 of the Municipal Act can
do no more than declare public highways for valid provincial purposes roads
that have become public highways pursuant to the provisions of the Indian Act
by surrender to the Crown and transfer of administration and control of the land
to the province.
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above are all in agreement. 14 1
Since the decision of the Supreme Court in Delgamuukw, the case law
involving the applicability of provincial laws on reserves relates equally to
Aboriginal title lands. In Delgamuukw, Lamer C.J.C. agreed with Dickson J.'s
holding in Guerin that the same legal principles govern the Aboriginal interest
in reserve lands and Aboriginal title lands, as that interest "is the same in both
cases."142 As we have seen, that interest is "the right to the land itself", which
"encompasses the right to exclusive use and occupation of the land." 143
Moreover, the federal parliament has the same exclusive jurisdiction over
both Indian reserves and Aboriginal title lands. 144 As Lamer C.J.C. said in
Delgamuukw, the "vesting of exclusive jurisdiction with the federal government
over Indians and Indian lands under s. 91(24), operates to preclude provincial
laws in relation to those matters." 145 This is precisely what was said in
Derrickson, Peace Arch, and Isaac about the applicability of provincial laws on
reserves. 146 So with respect to the application of provincial laws, as with the
nature of the Aboriginal interest, reserve lands and Aboriginal title lands are
in the same position-they both enjoy identical constitutional division of
powers protection against provincial legislation. 14 7
III. CONCLUSIONS
The Delgamuukw decision clarified that federal jurisdiction over "Lands
reserved for the Indians" extends to Aboriginal title lands. Moreover, Lamer
C.J.C. held that this jurisdiction, because it is exclusive, prevents provincial
laws from extinguishing Aboriginal title, either directly or indirectly. This is
because s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 "protects a core of federal
jurisdiction even from provincial laws of general application, through the
operation of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity."148 As Aboriginal
141 The only discrepancies I have found in the case law are over whether a leasehold interest held
by a non-Indian on a reserve is to be classified as "Land reserved for the Indians" (see supra
note 131) and whether a provincial law is to be characterized as a law in relation to land or
in relation to some other matter, such as safety or health (see supra notes 127, 139-40). But
once land is classified as reserve land, and a provincial law is characterized as a law in relation
to land, the law undoubtedly cannot apply to that land. Moreover, in no case that I am aware
of has s. 88 of the Indian Act been used to make such a law apply to Indian land: for discussion
of s. 88, see supra notes 30-48, 72-81 and accompanying text.
142 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 244; quoting from Guerin, supra note 102 at 379 [Lamer
C.J.C.'s emphasis].
143 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), ibid. at 252, 243: see, supra notes 55, 110, and accompanying text.
144 Ibid. at 267-69: see text accompanying notes 50-60.
145 Ibid. at 270.
146 It accords as well with the other cases cited, supra notes 131, 139-40.
147 Due to the doctrine of paramountcy, however, provisions of the Indian Act may provide
additional statutory protections to reserve lands that are not enjoyed by Aboriginal title
lands.
148 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 271: see text accompanying notes 61-71.
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rights, including Aboriginal title, are "part of the core of Indianness at the
heart of s. 91(24)," even prior to their recognition and affirmation by s. 35(1)
of the Constitution Act, 1982 "they could not be extinguished by provincial
laws of general application." 149
But given that Aboriginal title is at the heart of federal jurisdiction along
with other Aboriginal rights, and so is inextinguishable by provincial legislation,
it should be uninfringeable by provincial legislation as well. Provincial laws
infringing Aboriginal title might encroach less upon federal jurisdiction than
laws resulting in extinguishment, but they would encroach nonetheless
because the infringement would touch upon the core of Indianness at the
heart of s. 91(24). 150 They should therefore be inapplicable to Aboriginal title
lands. This conclusion is solidly supported by Derrickson and numerous other
cases that have held that provincial laws in relation to land do not apply to
"Lands reserved for the Indians", even if those laws are of general application.
So provincial laws do not have to be directed at those lands to be inapplicable
to them-as long as they are in relation to land, and particularly if they affect
use or occupation of it, they cannot apply to "Lands reserved for Indians"
without encroaching on exclusive federal jurisdiction. Moreover, this
conclusion was reached in Derrickson and other cases where no infringement
of Aboriginal title or other Aboriginal rights was even alleged. So if a
provincial law is in relation to land and infringes Aboriginal title, there is a
two-fold reason for excluding the application of that law. As a result, in areas
of the provinces where Aboriginal title can be proven to exist today, provincial
laws in relation to land are inapplicable, especially to the extent that they
infringe Aboriginal title.
Logically, this division of powers analysis precedes consideration of the
issue of whether infringements of Aboriginal title can be justified. If the
provinces have no jurisdiction to infringe Aboriginal title, they obviously
cannot justify infringements by resorting to the Sparrow test. In other words,
that test is simply not available to justify provincial infringements of
Aboriginal title that are unconstitutional because they offend the division of
powers by encroaching on exclusive federal jurisdiction. So the part of Lamer
C.J.C.'s judgment in Delgamuukw relating to justification of infringements of
Aboriginal title cannot apply to provincial legislation. Justification is only
available to a legislature having constitutional authority over Aboriginal title,
149 Ibid.
150 Even provincial laws that have not been shown to infringe an Aboriginal right cannot apply of
their own force to regulate Indian hunting if that would impair Indianness: see Dick, supra
note 31.
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and under our Constitution the only legislature with that authority is the
Parliament of Canada.
The implications of these conclusions for the distribution of federal-
provincial powers in provinces like British Columbia with large, unsettled
Aboriginal land claims are obviously enormous. Exclusive federal jurisdiction
over Aboriginal title lands means that provincial jurisdiction in areas that are
subject to that title is severely limited. The provinces are barred not only
from infringing and extinguishing Aboriginal title, but also from regulating
the use of those lands by laws of general application. In concrete terms, this
means that the provinces cannot derogate from Aboriginal title by granting
interests in land, or even licences for resource extraction, to third parties. Nor
can the provinces undertake developments of their own, such as hydroelectric
projects, on Aboriginal title lands. Those kinds of activities would clearly
violate the Aboriginal titleholders' right of exclusive use and occupation.
Even laws like zoning regulations, which place restrictions on the uses that
can be made of land, or building codes, which regulate the manner in which
particular uses are carried out, appear to be inapplicable. The only provincial
laws that could touch on Aboriginal title lands without violating federal
jurisdiction would be laws that, in pith and substance, were in relation to a
provincial area of jurisdiction other than land and did not otherwise impair
the status and capacity of Aboriginal peoples.
While these conclusions may appear startling, they are the logical result
of a string of judicial decisions, culminating in Delgarnuukw. Moreover, they
are consistent with the original scheme of Confederation, which placed
jurisdiction over and responsibility for "Indians, and Lands reserved for the
Indians" in the hands of Parliament. As Lord Watson pointed out in the St.
Catherine's case, the plain policy of the Constitution Act, 1867 was to place all
lands reserved for Indian occupation, and Indian affairs generally, under the
legislative control of one central authority so that uniformity of administration
would be ensured. 15 1 As a corollary to this, Lamer C.J.C. recognized in
Delgamuukw that "the government vested with primary constitutional
responsibility for securing the welfare of Canada's aboriginal peoples" needed
to be able to "safeguard one of the most central of native interests-their
interest in their lands."15 2 Barring the provinces from extinguishing,
infringing, and regulating Aboriginal title is thus not just consistent with,
but also essential to, the fulfillment of Parliament's jurisdiction and
responsibility. Provincial access to the lands and resources accorded to them
151 Supra note 12 and accompanying text.
152 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 269: see supra notes 16-17, 59 and accompanying text.
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by s. 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867153 has therefore always been subject
to settlement of unextinguished Aboriginal title claims by the federal
government. 154 Seen in this light, provincial opposition to the settlement of
Aboriginal land claims in the past was clearly a policy blunder of major
proportions. In British Columbia, at least, that blunder could have been
avoided if the province had listened to Aboriginal demands for treaties. 155
That may be the ultimate irony of the situation that the province finds itself
in today.
153 See text accompanying notes 53-54.
154 In the St. Catherine's case, supra note 12 at 59, Lord Watson said that the provinces' beneficial
interest in Indian lands becomes "available to them as a source of revenue whenever the
estate of the Crown is disencumbered of the Indian title": for discussion, see H. Foster,
"Aboriginal Title and the Provincial Obligation to Respect It: Is Delgamuukw v. British Columbia
'Invented Law'?" (1998) 56 The Advocate 221. Moreover, in the case of the territories out of
which the three prairie provinces were formed, settlement of Aboriginal title claims by the
federal government was expressly mandated by the Rupert's Land and North-Western
Territory Order of June 23, 1870, in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 9: see K. McNeil, Native Claims
in Rupert's Land and the North-Western Territory: Canada's Constitutional Obligations (Saskatoon:
University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1982).
155 See generally P. Tennant, Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British
Columbia, 1849-1989 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1990); R. Fisher,
Contact and Conflict: Indian-European Relations in British Columbia, 1774-1890, 2d ed.
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1992); H. Foster, "Letting Go the Bone: The
Idea of Indian Title in British Columbia, 1849-1927" in H. Foster &J. McLaren, eds., Essays in
the History of Canadian Law, Vol. 6: British Columbia and the Yukon (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press and The Osgoode Society, 1995) 28.

